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Post-Brexit will EU Data Protection Law 
Still Impact on Police Investigations into 
Terrorism and Organised Crime? 
 
Introduction 
January 2021 saw a total break of the UK from the 
European Union (EU). In post-Brexit UK terrorism 
and organised crime investigations two factors 
changed. One is the UK is longer part of the EU’s 
policing agency Europol and consequently has no ac-
cess to the terrorism/crime intelligence data, along 
with the fact that the UK no longer can access the Eu-
ropean Arrest Warrant (EAW). Secondly the Court of 
Justice of the European Union CJEU no longer has 
jurisdiction over UK policing investigations to deter-
mine if their actions or the legislation they rely upon 
violates the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms (CFRF), or do they? Terrorists and organ-
ised crime gangs do not recognise or respect geo-
graphical borders and with the UK still being part of 
continental Europe, a degree of co-operation will still 
have to exist with EU member states. Focusing pri-
marily on the police gathering of evidence via their 
powers related to the surveillance of electronic com-
munications, this article will examine the legal impli-
cations of intelligence and evidence sharing between 
UK and EU member states’ policing agencies.  
 
The Current Operational Situation Between the UK 
and the EU 
While an EU member state, UK policing agencies had 
access to EU’s policing agency Europol, including its 
European Counter Terrorism Centre that focuses on:  
1. Providing operational support upon a request  
    from an EU member state for investigations;  
2. Tackling foreign fighters;  
3. Sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism  
    financing;  
4. Dealing with terrorist propaganda and  
    extremism;  
5. Dealing with illegal arms trafficking;  
6. International co-operation among counter- 
    terrorism authorities. 
 
Due to the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC), this does not mean the UK suffered a major 
loss in its ability to investigate and counter terrorist 
activity. Established in 2003 and based at MI5’s head-
quarters at Thames House (although not part of 
MI5), JTAC analyses and assess all intelligence relat-
ing to terrorist activity. It brings together counter-ter-
rorism expertise from the police, the security services 
and governmental departments and agencies so in-
formation is analysed and processed in a shared basis 
to assess the nature and extent of the terrorist threat 
to the UK. Using this system, between 2017-2020 UK 
counter-terrorism agencies foiled 25 terrorism plots 
in the UK and this included passing on intelligence 
that foiled four terrorist plots in other EU member 
states in 2018. Although the UK would now come 
under working with the European Counter Terror-
ism Centre under international co-operation, this is 
not the same as being part of it, especially in relation 
to immediacy in intelligence sharing and support.  
 
Also, as an EU member state, the UK had access to 
the EU’s database Schengen Information System II 
(SIS) where, under law enforcement co-operation, 
SIS allows member states’ policing agencies to:  
1. Share biometric information such as DNA, facial  
    images and fingerprints;  
2. Share information on persons and objects  
    involved in terrorism related activities;  
3. Share information related to organised crime. 
 
Perhaps one of the biggest losses of the UK becoming 
a ‘third country’ post-Brexit is losing access to the 
EAW. The EU’s EAW is a rapid form of extradition 
that takes on average between 14 to 17 days com-
pared to the average of just over a year with tradi-
tional extradition treaties. The UK was a prolific user 
of EAW’s and it was not just one-way usage. In rela-
tion to the EAW, the UK assisted many EU member 
states’ investigations, a process that was beneficial to 
both UK and EU member states policing agencies. At 
the time of writing (January 2021) there is a degree of 
optimism that a separate agreement will be made pro-
ducing a variant of the EAW for use between the UK 
and the EU. While Brexit has created new trade 
agreements and borders, Brexit means little to ter-
rorists and criminals, who as stated, do not recognise 
state borders and the UK will still have to work with 
their EU member state partners, none more so than 
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland were An 
Garda Siochana constantly work closely with the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland. This is an important 
issue as post-Brexit UK policing agencies will still have 
to co-operate with EU member state policing agencies. 
 
Intelligence and Evidence Gathering via  
Surveillance of Communications 
In the UK intelligence and evidence gathering          
during police investigations is acquired through var-
ious methods ranging from the traditional static and 
mobile surveillance, which is governed as directed 
surveillance and intrusive surveillance under sections 
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27 and 32 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 (RIPA) respectively. Another method is in 
the use of covert human intelligence sources, com-
monly referred to as informants, which is governed 
by section 29 RIPA. Currently the law in the use of 
informants is changing with the introduction of the 
Covert Human Intelligence Resources (Criminal 
Conduct) Bill that at the time of writing is at its third 
reading in the House of Lords. When reading the law 
governing the use of these powers one can see the in-
fluence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) as serious consideration is given to 
various human rights when granting authorities to 
the police. 
 
Similar consideration is seen in the UK’s Investiga-
tory Powers Act 2016 that grants the police and                
security services (and where applicable the military, 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and, Border 
Agency) powers to obtain targeted interceptions war-
rants, warrants to obtain and retain communications 
data, bulk interception warrants and bulk interfer-
ence warrants (lawful hacking of communications de-
vices). Globally the use of electronic communications 
in society has grown exponentially, more so during 
the COVID-19 pandemic with the expansion in the 
use of online meetings facilities such as Zoom and Mi-
crosoft Teams, shopping and banking online. It is not 
just legitimate use of the various forms of communi-
cation that has expanded, both terrorists and organ-
ised crime gangs use and exploit electronic 
communications, especially in the use of deeply en-
crypted forms of communication. As such, powers 
granting policing agencies (including the security ser-
vices) access to unlawful use of electronic communi-
cations is necessary, provided those powers are 
balanced with consideration of the protection of 
human rights such as rights to privacy and data pro-
tection.  In the 2016 Act again we see the ECHR in-
fluence in the granting of these intrusive powers 
provided they are balanced with protecting relevant 
human rights. The authorities to interfere with these 
rights are only granted on the grounds of necessity, 
that is where it is under an act prescribed by law and 
necessary in a democratic society under certain 
grounds. These grounds include:  
1.  the interests of national security (this ground is  
     certainly relevant to terrorism investigations);  
2.  the prevention of disorder or crime;  
3.  public safety; and  
4.  the protection of rights and freedom of others.  
 
In relation to terrorist investigations the protection of 
the rights and freedom of others will include the right 
to life (article 2 ECHR), hence why intrusive inves-
tigative powers into the lives of citizens are necessary 
in order to prevent attacks from taking place. It is not 
only ECHR provisions we see in relation to the pro-
tection of rights, there is consideration of the EU’s 
CFRF and two important CJEU case decisions influ-
enced the drafting of the statutes. The relevance of 
this is with the UK being a third country, its law must 
be adequate in relation to the protection of human 
rights, as legislation like the Investigatory Powers Act 
was introduced while an EU member state, this Act 
will meet that criteria.  
 
Digital Rights and Tele 2 Cases 
Digital Rights: The 2006 Directive on Retention and 
Access to Communications Data and the Data Reten-
tion and Investigatory Powers Act 2015 
 
In Digital Rights ([2014] 3 WLR 1607) the CJEU ex-
amined the now repealed Directive 2006/24/EC that 
laid down an obligation on publicly available elec-
tronic communications services or public communi-
cations networks to retain certain data generated or 
processed by them. As the Directive allowed EU 
member states’ intelligence and policing agencies to 
collect bulk data, the CJEU examined the acceptable 
limits of mass surveillance and the function of data 
protection in relation to compatibility with articles 7 
(respect for private and family life) and 8 (protection 
of personal data) CFRF. The CJEU declared that the 
2006 Directive was invalid on two important legal is-
sues saying to ensure personal data is protected:  
1. EU legislation must lay down clear and precise  
    rules governing the scope and application of the  
    measure in question;  
2. Minimum safeguards are imposed to provide  
    sufficient guarantees effectively protecting  
    personal data against the risk of abuse and  
    against unlawful access and use. 
 
Under the 2006 Directive member states could retain 
bulk and personal data only when it was necessary 
and proportionate to do so. The CJEU held this 
phrase lacked the required specificity to allow lawful 
interference with that data and did not place a high 
enough level of protection of personal data, nor did 
it ensure there was an irreversible destruction of          
the data at the end of the data retention period. In 
Digital Rights the CJEU acknowledged data retention 
is an important strand in terrorism and serious crime 
investigations to ensure public safety and stated these 
specific grounds could be a justification. Article 52 al-
lows for limitations in the exercise of CFRF rights 
where, subject to proportionality, limitations can only 
be made where they are necessary and genuinely 
meet the objectives of general interest recognised by 
the EU. The CJEU held the retention of telecommu-
nications data to allow competent national authorities 
to have possible access must satisfy an objective of 
general interest under article 52 CFRF but added in 
doing so it is necessary to verify the proportionality 
of the interference found to exist. 
 
It was the latter point on proportionality where the 
2006 Directive failed as the CJEU found it was too 
broad as to the conditions and requirements as to why 
telecommunications data had to be retained and re-
garding access to it by competent authorities. As the 
retention included persons’ personal data who had 
not nor were suspected of being involved in any form 
of criminal or terrorist activity, the retention of the 
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data was being carried out in an indiscriminate man-
ner. The requirement under member state law that 
telecommunications data be retained by communica-
tions and internet service providers, it is essential the 
requirement to do so has to be for specific reasons, 
that includes defining what is meant by serious crime 
and disclosure/access to the data has to be necessary 
to assist in achieving the aim of an investigation and 
it must be proportionate. As a result of Digital Rights 
many member states repealed their domestic legisla-
tion governing the surveillance of electronic commu-
nications and retention of telecommunications data. 
This included the UK. It repealed the provisions in 
RIPA and introduced the Data Retention and Inves-
tigatory Powers Act 2015 (DRIPA) that was drafted 
with consideration to the Digital Rights decision, but 
in R (on the application of Davis and others) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department and others ([2015] EWHC 
2092 (Admin)) the UK’s High Court held that DRIPA 
did not comply with the decision in Digital Rights. The 
Court held that DRIPA did not lay down clear and 
precise rules regarding the access and use of com-
munications data, and, on safeguards, the Court held 
that judicial approval was important to ensure surveil-
lance authorities are not abused in order to protect 
citizens’ rights. 
 
Tele2 and Directive on Privacy and Electronic  
Communication 2002/58/EC 
In Tele2 Sverige AB, now referred to as Tele2 (2016] All 
ER (D) 107) the CJEU were requested to provide a 
primary ruling on the interpretation of Article 15(1) 
Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning e-privacy and electronic communications 
and its compatibility with Member States’ national law 
regarding the retention and access to telecommuni-
cations data. In the full title of the case it included the 
Davis case heard at the High Court mentioned above 
that was referred to the CJEU. In Tele 2 the CJEU        
examined citizens’ rights under the CFRF, mainly         
articles 7, 8, and 52. 
 
The aim of the 2002 e-Privacy Directive is to protect 
fundamental rights and freedom in relation to pri-
vacy when processing personal data in electronic 
communications, thereby ensuring the free move-
ment of that data and electronic communications and 
services in the EU, especially in relation to the pro-
tection of subscribers to communications companies’ 
services because in EU law subscribers are legal per-
sons. The Directive is clear that its provisions shall not 
apply to activities concerning: 
 
‘…public security, defence, State security  
(including the economic well-being of the State 
when the activities relate to State security matters) 
and the activities of the State in areas of  
criminal law.’  
 
Article 5 states that member states must ensure the 
confidentiality of communications, including related 
traffic data by means of a public communications net-
work and publicly available electronic services 
through their national legislation. This includes the 
prohibition of listening, tapping, storage or other 
kinds of interception or surveillance of communica-
tions and related traffic data by persons other than 
the users without the consent of the users concerned. 
Article 5 contains an exception to this where such ac-
tivity is legally authorised in accordance with article 
15(1) of the 2002 Directive. Article 15(1) allows mem-
ber states to legislate to restrict the privacy, rights and 
freedoms related to electronic communications when 
it is a:  
‘…necessary, appropriate and proportionate  
measure within a democratic society to safeguard 
national security (i.e. state security), defence,  
public security, and the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences…’   
 
In Tele2 the CJEU pointed out these restrictions laid 
down in member states’ national legislation to privacy 
only apply only if the member states adopt and meet 
all the conditions laid down in the Directive. Although 
recognising that fighting serious crime, especially or-
ganised crime and terrorism, depends to a great ex-
tent on the use of modern investigation techniques 
where telecommunications data evidence can be ef-
fective, the CJEU added:  
‘…such an objective of general interest, however 
fundamental it may be, cannot  in itself justify  
that national legislation providing for the general 
interest and indiscriminate retention of all traffic 
and location data should be considered to be 
 necessary for the purposes of that fight.’  
 
While acknowledging the importance the role the re-
tention of telecommunications data plays in the fight 
against serious crime, the CJEU’s guidance in rela-
tion to this matter is it should be read in light of arti-
cles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) CFRF by adopting legislation 
permitting as a preventative measure targeted reten-
tion of traffic and location data for the purpose of 
fighting crime. The important points in article 52(1) 
that must be considered are:  
 
1. The limitation of the exercise of rights and  
    freedoms must be provided for by law; and  
2. The limitations must be subject to the principles  
     of proportionality; and  
3. The limitations must be necessary; and   
4. The limitations must meet the general interest  
     recognised by the EU. 
 
The CJEU added the retention of the data must be 
limited to the categories for data to be retained, the 
means of communication affected, the persons con-
cerned, and the retention period adopted, with all 
limitations being strictly necessary. 
 
Conclusion: Current Impact of CJEU Decisions and 
EU Law on the UK 
In relation to the surveillance of electronic commu-
nications, the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
took cognizance of the CJEU’s decisions in both          
Digital Rights and Tele2, as well as the High Court de-
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cision in R (on the application of Davis and others). 
Throughout the Act it consistently states the granting 
of authorities must be proportionate and necessary 
with the general interest being to allow relevant state 
agencies to interfere with those rights on the grounds:  
1.  of the interests of national security;  
2.  to prevent or detect serious crime; or,   
3.  in the interests of the economic well-being of the  
     UK when those interests are relevant to the  
     interests of national security. 
 
It is clear the general interest covered in the Act re-
lates to serious criminal and terrorist activity. Being a 
third country, this is important as in Maximillian 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ([2014] IEHC 
310) the CJEU held when dealing with third coun-
tries the EU must ensure there are adequate levels of 
data protection and privacy rights. The CJEU added 
this is an ongoing obligation to ensure there are no 
changes made by the third country and the EU Com-
mission has a duty to regularly review a third coun-
try’s level of protection. Unlike many other third 
countries the EU deal with, like the EU’s member 
states, the UK is a signatory to the ECHR that is en-
shrined into UK law through the Human Rights Act 
1998. Under this Act the UK public authorities must 
act in a way and its statutes are compatible with the 
ECHR, thereby ensuring another adequate level of 
protection of human rights.  
 
In relation to intelligence and evidence gathering this 
is important as on matters of serious organised crime 
and terrorism, the UK will still have to work in co-op-
eration with EU member states. While it is submitted 
that the UK’s current legislation relating to investiga-
tions into these activities provide more than adequate 
levels of human rights protection, in fact they could 
be seen as comparable, it will be future legislation in-
troduced by the UK Parliament that could be a cause 
for concern. This returns us to the question raised           
at the beginning of this article, would CJEU have           
jurisdiction on UK law? While the CJEU would not 
have jurisdiction, its decisions could have an impact 
on future UK/EU policing agencies co-operation as 
seen in the Schrems decision that brought an end to 
the EU-US Harbour Agreement (although following 
that decision an new agreement was quickly drafted 
and agreed on). Returning to the point that organ-
ised crime gangs and terrorists have no respect for 
borders, the UK is a major player in investigations 
into this activity and it is not one-way activity with the 
UK solely benefiting from the EU, the 27 EU mem-
ber states also benefit from UK co-operation. It is on 
this point there is optimism an agreement will be 
made in relation policing co-operation and that on 
these matters the UK Parliament will ensure that any 
future legislation governing policing activity will          
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